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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
SIMONE LUCIA KENT,

Case No. 960606-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for Computer
Crimes, a 2nd degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-703 (Supp. 1996) (a copy of the judgment is attached hereto as
Addendum A ) , in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robert K. Hilder,
presiding.

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue presented for review is as follows:
Whether Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703 (Supp. 1996), as applied
in this matter, violates due process under the state and federal
constitutions and the equal protection provision of the federal
constitution. The conduct proscribed by the statute requires
proof of the same conduct proscribed by Utah's forgery, and
insurance and communications fraud statutes. Yet § 76-6-703
provides a harsher penalty to those found guilty.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The issue presented on appeal is a

question of law, with respect to which this Court will not defer
1

in any degree to the trial court but will review the trial
court's determination for correctness.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d

932, 936 (Utah 1994).
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
Appellant's Motion to Strike Computer Crimes Statute and
supporting memorandum are preserved in the Record on Appeal
("R.") at 20-25.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following rules, statutes and constitutional provisions
will be determinative of the issue on appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1996).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521 (1995).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703 (Supp. 1996).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (Supp. 1996).
Article I, Section 2, Utah Constitution.
Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution.
Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution.
Amendment VI, United States Constitution.
Amendment XIV, United States Constitution.
The text of those provisions is contained in the attached
Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and
Disposition in the Court Below.
In November 1995, the State of Utah charged Appellant Simone
2

Lucia Kent ("Kent") with two counts of Computer Crimes, second
degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703 (Supp. 1996), and
served her with an arrest warrant.

(R. 1-4; 7-9.)

Kent request-

ed the entry of an order striking the Computer Crimes statute as
unconstitutional. (R. 21-25.) The trial court denied the request.
(R. 75-76.)
Thereafter, the parties entered into a plea agreement (R.
46-54) wherein Kent pled guilty to one count of the Computer
Crimes offense and the state dismissed the second count.
77.)

(R. 76-

The parties specifically conditioned the plea upon Kent's

right to appeal the statutory and constitutional challenges to
the Computer Crimes statute, pursuant to Rule 11(i), Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure, and State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 93 5 (Utah App.
1988).

(R. 50; 76- 83.)

After entry of the plea, the trial court sentenced Kent to
serve one to fifteen years imprisonment and to pay restitution.
(R. 59.)

The trial court stayed the prison sentence and placed

Kent on probation.

(Id.)

Kent's appeal of the trial court's

ruling on the constitutionality of Section 76-6-703 is from the
final judgement in this matter.

(R. 60; 65-66.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Kent was charged by Information with two counts of Computer
Crimes, second degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703
(Supp. 1996).

(R. 1-4.)

The Information stated in part:

A complaint has been made . . . that you committed the
crimes of:
COUNT 1:
3

COMPUTER CRIMES, a Second Degree Felony, at Salt Lake City,
in Salt Lake County, Utah, on or about March 2, 1995 through
March 9, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section
703, Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended, in that the defendant,
SIMONE LUCIA KENT, a party to the offense, did intentionally
use a computer, computer network, computer property, or
computer system, program, or software to devise or execute
any artifice or scheme to defraud or to obtain money,
property, services, or other things of value, to-wit: a
check in the amount of $3,500. from First Health, by false
pretenses, promises, or representations.
(R. 1-3.)

The second count contained similar language, but

reflected receipt of a check in the amount of $7,500.

The

probable cause statement stated the following:
On March 17, 1995, FBI Special Agent W. Stephen Whittle
received information from Leslie Warner of the First Health
security department, in Salt Lake City, Utah, that possible
computerized fraud had occurred in their insurance claim
system, and that two unauthorized checks for $3,500 and
$7,500 had been sent from their office to a post office box
located in West Valley City, UT. in the name of Cathleen
Gullett. The defendant was identified as the operator of
the terminal from which the unauthorized checks had been
issued.
(R. 2-3.) Kent challenged Section 76-6-703 as unconstitutional
since it requires proof of the same elements set forth in other
Utah criminal statutes, yet provides a harsher penalty.
25.)

(R. 21-

The trial court rejected Kent's challenge, and the state

agreed to the entry of a plea pursuant to Sery, 758 P.2d at 935,
in order that Kent could seek review on appeal of the trial
court's ruling.

(R. 46-54; 76-83.)

During the plea colloquy,

the prosecutor stated the following:
[Trial court to the prosecutor]: And you don't have an
objection to the Sery plea and reserving the right to appeal
this ruling on the Constitutionality [of the statute]?
[Prosecutor]: To appeal the Constitutionality, I'm not going
to object[.]
•

*

4

*

Because of the seriousness of the Constitutionality
challenge, I have given Counsel [for Kent] a lot of leeway
on this and I will not object to that portion of this
agreement as well.
(R. 77-78.)

Kent entered a guilty plea to Count 1 of the

Information and the state dismissed the second count. (R. 46-54;
76-83.)

Thereafter the trial court sentenced Kent to prison,

then stayed the sentence and imposed three years probation and
restitution.

(R. 59.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Computer Crimes statute set forth at Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-703 (Supp. 1996) is violative of the due process provisions
of the state and federal constitutions and the equal protection
provision of the federal constitution in that it proscribes
conduct addressed in other statutes, to wit: the Insurance Fraud
statute, the Forgery statute, and the Communications Fraud
statute.

The Computer Crimes statute provides a harsher penalty

than is provided in the other statutes, thereby subjecting
defendants to differing penalties.

Equal protection of the laws

requires that the law affects alike all persons similarly
situated.
equal.

The penalty proscribed for like offenses must be

Because the Computer Crimes statute provides a harsher

penalty, it is violative of the equal protection provision of the
federal constitution.

In addition, because the Computer Crimes

statute requires proof of the same elements set forth in other
statutes, it violates the due process provisions of the state and
federal constitutions - - i t creates doubt or uncertainty as to
5

which statute is applicable and gives the prosecutor impermissible discretion to choose a defendant's penalty based upon which
statute the prosecutor chooses to charge under. Kent requests
that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the basis
that the Computer Crimes statute is unconstitutional as applied
in this case, and remand this matter to have Kent's case proceed
under one of the statutes providing a less severe punishment.
ARGUMENT
THE COMPUTER CRIMES STATUTE IS DUPLICATIVE OF OTHER
STATUTES AS TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME YET PUNISHES
MORE HARSHLY, COMPELLING THE DETERMINATION THAT KENT IS
ENTITLED TO BE CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE CARRYING THE
LESS SEVERE PUNISHMENT,
A. THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS REQUIRE EVEN-HANDED
PUNISHMENT UNDER THE LAW.
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution protects
citizens of the state against arbitrary and capricious laws.

It

provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law."

The federal counterpart

is the Fourteenth Amendment: "No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
Const, amend. XIV.

U.S.

Under a due process analysis,

[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those
who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.
Gravned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)
(footnotes omitted); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,
6

357 (1983); Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816,
819 (Utah 1991) .

The United States Supreme Court has explained

that the vagueness doctrine is critical with respect to a
legislative failure to provide sufficient guidelines concerning
the application of a penal statute.
Our Constitution is designed to maximize individual
freedoms within a frame work of ordered liberty.
Statutory limitations on those freedoms are examined
for substantive authority and content as well as for
definiteness or certainty of expression.
As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness
doctrine requires that a penal statute define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement. Although the doctrine
focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary
enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more
important aspect of the vagueness doctrine "is not
actual notice, but the other principal element of the
doctrine -- the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement."
Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal
guidelines, a criminal statute may permit "a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and
juries to pursue their personal predilections."
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58 (citations omitted).

The Utah

Supreme Court has also denounced vagueness in penal statutes:
The well-established rule is that a statute creating a crime
should be sufficiently certain that persons of ordinary
intelligence who desire to obey the law may know how to
conduct themselves in conformity with it.[] A fair and
logical concomitant of that rule is that such a penal
statute should be similarly clear, specific and
understandable as to the penalty imposed for its violation.
State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1969).

In that regard,

the Utah Supreme Court recognized the rule "that where there is
doubt or uncertainty as to which of two punishments is applicable
to an offense an accused is entitled to the benefit of the
lesser."

Id.
7

Likewise, "where there are two statutes which proscribe the
same conduct but impose different penalties, the violator is entitled to the lesser." State v. Loveless, 581 P.2d 575, 577 (Utah
1978) (quoting Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977)).
Accordingly, the criminal laws must be written so that there
are significant differences between offenses and so that the
exact same conduct is not subject to different penalties
depending upon which of two statutory sections a prosecutor
chooses to charge. To allow that would be to allow a form
of arbitrariness that is foreign to our system of law. The
legislature may make automobile homicide which is committed
recklessly either a misdemeanor or a felony, but it cannot
make the crime both a felony and a misdemeanor, leaving the
choice to the prosecutor as to whether he charges a felony
or a misdemeanor.
Because a "reckless" defendant could, for the same
behavior, be charged under either statute, the statutes give
a prosecutor impermissible discretion to choose a
defendant's penalty based upon which statute the prosecutor
chooses to charge under.
State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985).
The early Utah Supreme Court also found disfavor in the
notion of leaving the choice to the prosecutor when more than one
criminal statute may apply, as set forth in this example:
For example, A., who has disposed of intoxicating liquor to
an Indian, might be charged with and convicted of a felony,
and sentenced to a term in the state prison, while B., who
might be equally guilty, but favored by some county attorney
as the initial prosecutor, would be charged and convicted of
a misdemeanor only, and thus be fined or at most sent to the
county jail for 3 0 days.
State v. Carman, 140 P. 670, 671 (Utah 1914) .
Likewise, the Equal Protection Clause of the federal
constitution provides: "persons similarly situated should be
treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should
not be treated as if their circumstances were the same."

Malan

v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984); McLaughlin v. Florida,
8

379 U.S. 184, 190 (1964); U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1; Utah Const.
art. I, § 2 ("all free governments are founded on their authority
for their equal protection").
To that end, the Utah Supreme Court has stated:
[A] prosecutor should not have the freedom to choose between
charging either a felony or a misdemeanor when the two
crimes have exactly the same substantive elements. We agree
that that situation would deny defendant and others in his
class equal protection of the laws, "if the same identical
facts may be used in prosecutions under two completely integrated statutes, one a misdemeanor and the other a felony."
Bryan, 709 P.2d at 261 (quoting State v. Twitchell, 333 P.2d
1075, 1077 (Utah 1959)). It is well established that a statute
proscribing the same conduct as another statute, but providing a
harsher penalty, violates due process and equal protection under
the state and federal constitutions. In comparing the Computer
Crimes statute to the Insurance and Communications Fraud statutes
and the Forgery statute, the penalty imposed by the Computer
Crimes statute is unfair and uneven.

The trial court erred in

failing to proceed under one of the statutes with the less severe
penalty, as further discussed in Section D., below.
B. THE MENTAL STATE THAT MUST BE PROVED TO CONVICT A
DEFENDANT OF AN OFFENSE ESTABLISHES THE "GRADE" OF THE
OFFENSE FOR PUNISHMENT PURPOSES.
In construing the application of criminal laws, the Utah
Supreme Court has recognized that the differences in the "grade"
of offenses (i.e. from class C to A misdemeanors, and third to
first degree felonies) are manifested by the increasingly
culpable mental states of the offenses.

"If the State can prove

that a defendant acted with the more culpable mental state, the
defendant can be convicted of the higher offense."
9

Bryan, 709

P.2d at 262. Associating the grade of an offense with a certain
mental culpability assures rational, even-handed application of
the criminal laws, satisfying due process and equal protection
concerns.

That association is compelling basis for reversing the

trial court's ruling and requiring it to proceed with this matter
under one of the more lenient statutes as set forth in Section
D., below.
C. ACCORDING TO UTAH LAW, A SPECIFIC STATUTE APPLIES OVER A
MORE GENERAL STATUTE.
In cases where the alleged conduct may be charged under
either a specific statute or a general statute, the state may
"charge a violation of the statute that 'applies more
specifically to [defendant's] offense.'"

State v. Hales, 652

P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah 1982) (quoting Rammell, 560 P.2d at 1110).
In Hales, a custodian of public records was charged under § 76-8412, as an "officer having the custody of any record," with willfully mutilating such records. The offense was a third degree
felony. Defendant contended she should have been charged under
the general "tampering with records" provision, which was a class
B misdemeanor offense that applied to "any person."

The Utah

Supreme Court found defendant's argument unpersuasive:
Even assuming arguendo that the acts prohibited by these two
sections are identical, however, section 76-8-412 applies to
an "officer having the custody of any record," whereas
section 76-6-504 applies to "[a]ny person." The distinction
is manifestly rational. Public officials have greater
access to public records and, by virtue of the public trust
reposed in them, a higher responsibility to safeguard the
interests and property of the public than do other members
of the community. For a public official to destroy public
records is a betrayal of the public trust and therefore more
serious than the same act committed by a private individual.
Similarly, any person with formal custody of public records,
10

even if not a public
trust on a temporary
other custodians are
records entrusted to
than severe criminal
destructive acts.

officer, has received a limited public
basis. But because public officers and
themselves charged with protecting the
them, the State has little means other
deterrents to guard against their

Id. at 1293; see also. State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747, 749-50 (Utah
1986) (defendants charged with more specific crime of
fraudulently "signing" financial transaction card); State v.
Clark, 632 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 1981) (recognizing difference
between general theft statute and specific theft of livestock
statute);

Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah 1979)

(where conflict between statute dealing with controlled substances and forgery statute existed, former specific statute
applied to offense of obtaining controlled substances in prescription form, specifically where controlled substance act
required application of such a provision in the face of a conflict) ; State v. Verdin, 595 P.2d 862, 862-63 (Utah 1979); State
v. Vogt, 824 P.2d 455, 457 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Duran, 772
P.2d 982, 987 (Utah App. 1989) (statutes applied to different
classes of persons, making specific statute applicable).
As set forth below, the conduct alleged in the Information
against Kent is punishable under the specific provisions of at
least three other statutes. The Computer Crimes statute carries a
harsher punishment. Thus, the trial court should have resolved
the conflict in Kent's favor by proceeding under the statute with
the less severe penalty.
D. WHERE MORE THAN ONE STATUTE PROSCRIBES THE SPECIFIC
CONDUCT AT ISSUE IN THIS MATTER, KENT IS ENTITLED TO HAVE
THE CASE PROCEED UNDER THE STATUTE THAT PROVIDES THE LESS
SEVERE PUNISHMENT.
11

Shondel, Loveless, Bryan, Hales, Clark, and Helmuth, reflect
the following: (1) Where two or more statutes define a criminal
offense based on essentially the same conduct, the defendant is
entitled to have his or her case proceed under the statute that
carries the less severe penalty (see also State v. Fair, 456 P.2d
168, 168-69 (Utah 1969) (according to the court in Shondel,
legislation "making an act subject to two legislative fiats one
of which would penalize an accused as a misdemeanant, the other
as a felon, gave the accused the benefit of being accountable
only for the lesser of the two penalties")); (2) statutes
specifying greater culpable mental states carry greater
punishments (Bryan, 709 P.2d at 262); and (3) specific statutes
apply over general statutes (Helmuth, 598 P.2d at 335).
In this matter, Kent was charged with violations of the
Computer Crimes statute set forth at § 76-6-703(3):
A person who uses or knowingly allows another person to use
any computer, computer network, computer property, or
computer system, program, or software to devise or execute
any artifice or scheme to defraud or to obtain money,
property, services, or other things of value by false
pretenses, promises, or representations, is guilty of a
felony of the second degree.
The mental culpability that must be proved under the offense is
undefined, except where a person "knowingly

allows another person

to use" a computer system.

Another element of the offense is the

element of "defraud[ing]."

The terms "fraud" and "defraud" have

been defined as follows: "Fraud is defined as an instance or an

12

act of trickery or deceit; an act of deluding; an intentional
misrepresentation for the purpose of inducing another in reliance
upon it to part with some valuable thing." State v. Kitchen, 564
P.2d 760, 763 (Utah 1977).
1. Comparing the Computer Crimes Statute to the Forgery
Statute.
The Forgery statute provides the following:
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to
defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a
fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
*

*

*

(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates,
issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so
that the writing or the making, completion, execution,
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or
utterance purports to be the act of another, whether
the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to
have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered
sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a
copy of an original when no such original exists.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1996).

Like the Computer Crimes

statute, the Forgery statute requires proof of "defraud[ing]" in
the making, completion, transfer or utterance, etc., of a false
"writing."

The Forgery statute defines "writing" as including

"electronic storage or transmission." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6501 (2) (Supp. 1996) .
The mental culpability that must be established to prove
fraud in the Forgery statute is "purpose."

It is greater than,

or at least equal to, that which is required under the Computer
Crimes statute.

Thus, under Bryan, the Computer Crimes statute

should carry the same less severe punishment as that set forth in
the Forgery statute.

See section B., supra.

Yet the Computer

Crimes statute carries a harsher punishment. The fairer penalty
13

in this matter is the third degree penalty as set forth in the
Forgery statute as opposed to the harsher Computer Crimes statute
penalty.
In addition, the Forgery statute is more specifically
tailored to fit the facts articulated in the Information in this
matter, where the Information sets forth that fraud was committed
"possibl[y]" by electronic

transmission,

and as a result of that

act, unauthorized checks were sent to "Cathleen Gullett," an

existent

or nonexistent

person,

and that Kent had been

"identified as the operator of the terminal from which the

unauthorized

checks

had been issued."

(R. 2-3 (emphasis added).)

Inasmuch as the Forgery statute is specifically tailored to
the facts of this matter as set forth in the Information (R. 1-4)
and contains the less severe penalty (notwithstanding the proof
under the Forgery statute of an equal, if not greater, mens

rea) ,

and inasmuch as the separate laws create a conflict that leave
the prosecutor with the discretion to charge either offense, the
trial court erred in refusing to (1) resolve the conflict in
Kent's favor and (2) apply the statute with the less severe
penalty.

Bryan, 709 P.2d at 264; Loveless, 581 P.2d at 577;

Shondel, 453 P.2d at 148; Hales, 652 P.2d at 1292; Clark, 632
P.2d at 844; Helmuth, 598 P.2d at 335.
2. Comparing the Computer Crimes Statute and the Insurance
Fraud Statute.
The Insurance Fraud statute at Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521,
provides that if a person "with intent

to defraud," presents "or

causes to be presented" any "representation" in support of an
14

insurance claim "for payment" or other benefit pursuant to a
policy, certificate or contract, "knowing that the statement or
representation contains false or fraudulent information
concerning any fact or thing material to the claim," the conduct
is punishable "in the manner prescribed by Section 76-10-1801 for
communication fraud for property of like value."
§ 76-6-521(1)(b), (2)(b) (1995).

Utah Code Ann.

Section 76-10-1801 would make

the offense in this action a third degree felony where "the value
of the property, money, or thing obtained" as set forth in Count
1 exceeded $1,000 but was less than $5,000.
The elements of Insurance Fraud include an "intent" element.
The mental culpability is at least equal to, if not greater than,
that set forth in the Computer Crimes statute, which leaves the
mental culpability undefined except where the statute makes it
criminal to "knowingly allow another to use" a computer system.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703(3) (Supp. 1996). Under Bryan, since the
difference in grade between the Insurance Fraud statute

("intent

to defraud") and the Computer Crimes statute ("knowingly" use) is
of decreasing, or at least equal, mental culpability, see Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-2-103 and -104 (1995), both statutes should carry
the same less severe punishment.

See section B., supra.

Yet the

Computer Crimes statute carries a harsher punishment. The fairer
penalty in this matter is the third degree penalty as set forth
in the Insurance Fraud statute and § 76-10-1801, as opposed to
the harsher Computer Crimes statute penalty.
Notwithstanding the difference in punishment, the Insurance
15

Fraud statute, like the Computer Crimes statute, requires proof
of fraud in connection with obtaining a payment. The Insurance
Fraud statute is more specifically tailored to the facts alleged
in the Information in this case, where the statute applies to
fraud occurring in connection with an insurance claim and to
payments made as a result of the alleged fraud. In this matter,
the trial court stated the offense at issue consisted of
l!

hav[ing] the insurance company send checks that were not

warranted, to a P.O. Box, in fact." (R. 76.) Likewise, the
Information stated, "[o]n March 17, 1995, FBI Special Agent . . .
received information from . . . First Health security department
. . . that possible computerized fraud had occurred in their
insurance claim system, and that two unauthorized checks
had been sent from their office. . . ."

...

(R. 2-3.)

Inasmuch as the Insurance Fraud statute goes specifically to
the facts at issue in this matter as set forth in the Information
(R. 1-4) and contains the less severe penalty

(notwithstanding

the proof under the Insurance Fraud statute of the greater
"intent" mens

rea),

and inasmuch as the Insurance Fraud statute

and the Computer Crimes statute create a conflict in that the
laws leave the prosecutor with the discretion to charge either
offense, the trial court erred in refusing to (1) resolve the
conflict in favor of Kent and (2) apply the statute with the less
severe penalty.

Bryan, 709 P.2d at 264; Loveless, 581 P.2d at

577; Shondel, 453 P.2d at 148; Hales, 652 P.2d at 1292; Clark,
632 P.2d at 844; Helmuth, 598 P.2d at 335.
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3. Comparing the Computer Crimes Statute to the
Communications Fraud Statute.
Finally, the Communications Fraud statute provides that a
person who engages in purposeful, fraudulent conduct when the
value of the property is between $1,000 and $5,000 may be
punishable for a third degree felony:
Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money, property, or
anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions, and who
communicates directly or indirectly with any person by means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or
artifice is guilty of . . . a third degree felony when the
value of the property, money, or thing obtained or sought to
be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1) (a) and (c) (Supp. 1996). That
provision requires proof of "purpose."

Again, the mental

culpability is greater than, or at least equal to, that which
must be proved under the Computer Crimes statute.

In addition,

as with the other statutes, the Communications Fraud statute
requires proof of fraud and the same other elements set forth in
the Computer Crimes statute. The trial court should have required
application of the Communications Fraud statute -- it provides
the less severe penalty.
The Computer Crimes statute requires proof of the elements
set forth in three other Utah statutes that are more specifically
tailored to the facts alleged in the Information in this matter.
The three separate statutes require the state to prove a mens

rea

equal to or greater than that required in the Computer Crimes
statute, and they carry lesser penalties.

The trial court erred

in failing to declare the Computer Crimes statute
17

unconstitutional in the context of this case and in failing to
enter an order that the state must proceed under one of the other
criminal provisions carrying the less severe penalty.
CONCLUSION
Kent hereby respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the judgment of the trial court.
SUBMITTED this 32/JL day of

CZU^^^y.

, 1996.

INDA M. JONES//
LINDA
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

JUDITH A. JENSEN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

IN T H E T H I R D JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF U T A H
THE STATE OF UTAH.
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff,

Case No.

vs.

Honorable.
Clerk Jy.
Reporter
Bailiff
Date

Defendant.

!

&? rs^ffr

to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; D the court; dtfplea of guilty;
D plea q j j i o contest; of the offense of ( ^ ^ i i C T l
(}MjfV\qj
L _ , a felony
of the r y ~ dearee, D a class
misdemeanor, being now presept in court and ready for sentence and
represented hy^N - v\Q JVYflGVy - and the State being represented hy(y. ffllAfJM &J\JK now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D to a maximum mandatory term of.
years and which may be for life;
D y not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
; D
* of not less than five years and which may be for life;
D not to exceed
years;
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
^y^Tr#"V \ t —
" A ^ A n /)
^ and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ QEQ
to U^J<X^\0L\/J
NJL<^
D
D
D
D
\g
'

such sentence is to run concurrently with
such sentence is to run consecutively with
upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s)

are hereby dismissed.

Defendant is granted a stay of the above (£lPrison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and.urKler the^uggrvision of thr _Chirf Agont I Itnh Rtntn nnpnilmrnt nf ftrlult
<£a»le for the period of ^ ( 0 V V \ V A \ ^
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
• Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D f o r ^ f a a s j y j o ^ e Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where
rf^r^aiit's^rbeqonfined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. f£ >'<>y \-~~> -\% •*< „ * x
D Commitment shall issue
^

dxH
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ADDENDUM B

76-6-501. Forgery - "Writing" defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any
such altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion,
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including
forms such as:
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks,
money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification;
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued
by a government or any agency; or
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary
interest in or claim against any person or enterprise.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree.

76-6-521. False or fraudulent insurance act — Punishment as for theft.
(1) A person commits a fraudulent insurance act if that person with intent
to defraud:
(a) presents or causes to be presented any oral or written statement or
representation knowing that the statement or representation contains
false or fraudulent information concerning any fact material to an application for the issuance or renewal of an insurance policy, certificate, or
contract;
(b) presents, or causes to be presented, any oral or written statement or
representation as part of or in support of a claim for payment or other
benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, certificate, or contract, or in
connection with any civil claim asserted for recovery of damages for
personal or bodily injuries or property damage, knowing that the statement or representation contains false or fraudulent information concerning any fact or thing material to the claim;
(c) knowingly accepts a benefit from proceeds derived from a fraudulent
insurance act;
(d) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, devises a scheme or artifice to
obtain fees for professional services, or anything of value by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions.
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a class B misdemeanor.
(b) A violation of Subsections (l)(b) through (l)(d), is punishable as in
the manner prescribed by Section 76-10-1801 for communication fraud for
property of like value.
(3) A corporation or association is guilty of the offense of insurance fraud
under the same conditions as those set forth in Section 76-2-204.
(4) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsections (1Kb)
through (l)(d) shall be measured by the total value of all property, money, or
other things obtained or sought to be obtained by the fraudulent insurance act
or acts described in Subsections (1Kb) through (l)(d).

76-6-703. Computer crimes and penalties.
(1) A person who gains or attempts to gain access to and without authorization intentionally, and to the damage of another, alters, damages, destroys,
discloses, or modifies any computer, computer network, computer property,
computer system, program, or software is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
(2) A person who intentionally and without authorization uses a computer,
computer network, computer property, or computer system to gain or attempt
to gain access to any other computer, computer network, computer property, or
computer system, program, or software, to the damage of another, and alters,
damages, destroys, discloses, or modifies any of these, is guilty of a felony of the
third degree.
(3) A person who uses or knowingly allows another person to use any
computer, computer network, computer property, or computer system, program, or software to devise or execute any artifice or scheme to defraud or to
obtain money, property, services, or other things of value by false pretenses,
promises, or representations, is guilty of a felony of the second degree.
(4) A person who intentionally and without authorization interferes with or
interrupts computer services to another authorized to receive the services is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(5) A person who intentionally and without authorization damages or
destroys, in whole or in part, any computer, computer network, computer
property, or computer system is guilty of a class A misdemeanor unless the
amount of damage is or exceeds $1,000, in which case the person is guilty of a
felony of the third degree.

76-10-1801. Communications fraud — Elements — Penalties.
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or
to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and
who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than
$1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than
$5,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value.
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall
be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or
sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1)
except as provided in Subsection (l)(e).
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the
offense described in Subsection (1).
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing
of value is not a necessary element of the offense.
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and
offense of communication fraud.
(6) (a) Tb communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow,
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to
talk over; or to transmit information.
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the
mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and
spoken and written communication.
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made
or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth.

Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free governments are
founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit, and they
have the right to alter or reform their government as the public welfare may
require.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.

